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Abstract—We examine the behavior of multi-agent networks
where information-sharing is subject to a positive communi-
cations cost over the edges linking the agents. We consider
a general mean-square-error formulation where all agents are
interested in estimating the same target vector. We first show
that, in the absence of any incentives to cooperate, the optimal
strategy for the agents is to behave in a selfish manner with
each agent seeking the optimal solution independently of the
other agents. Pareto inefficiency arises as a result of the fact
that agents are not using historical data to predict the behavior
of their neighbors and to know whether they will reciprocate and
participate in sharing information. Motivated by this observation,
we develop a reputation protocol to summarize the opponent’s
past actions into a reputation score, which can then be used
to form a belief about the opponent’s subsequent actions. The
reputation protocol entices agents to cooperate and turns their
optimal strategy into an action-choosing strategy that enhances
the overall social benefit of the network. In particular, we show
that when the communications cost becomes large, the expected
social benefit of the proposed protocol outperforms the social
benefit that is obtained by cooperative agents that always share
data. We perform a detailed mean-square-error analysis of the
evolution of the network over three domains: far field, near-field,
and middle-field, and show that the network behavior is stable
for sufficiently small step-sizes. The various theoretical results
are illustrated by numerical simulations.
Index Terms—Adaptive networks, self-interested agents, repu-
tation design, diffusion strategy, Pareto efficiency, mean-square-
error analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
ADAPTIVE networks enable agents to share informationand to solve distributed optimization and inference tasks
in an efficient and decentralized manner. In most prior works,
agents are assumed to be cooperative and designed to fol-
low certain distributed rules such as the consensus strategy
(e.g., [2]–[10]) or the diffusion strategy (e.g., [11]–[19]). These
rules generally include a self-learning step to update the
agents’ estimates using their local data, and a social-learning
step to fuse and combine the estimates shared by neighboring
agents. However, when agents are selfish, they would not obey
the preset rules unless these strategies conform to their own
interests, such as minimizing their own costs. In this work,
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we assume that the agents can behave selfishly and that they,
therefore, have the freedom to decide whether or not they want
to participate in sharing information with their neighbors at
every point in time. Under these conditions, the global social
benefit for the network can be degraded unless a policy is
introduced to entice agents to participate in the collaborative
process despite their individual interests. In this article, we
will address this difficulty in the context of adaptive networks
where agents are continually subjected to streaming data, and
where they can predict in real-time, from their successive
interactions, how reliable their neighbors are and whether they
can be trusted to share information based on their past history.
This formulation is different from the useful work in [20],
which considered one particular form of selfish behavior in
the context of a game-theoretic formulation. In that work, the
focus is on activating the self-learning and social learning steps
simultaneously, and agents simply decide whether to enter into
a sleep mode (to save energy) or to continue acquiring and
processing data. In the framework considered in our work,
agents always remain active and are continually acquiring data;
the main question instead is to entice agents to participate
in the collaborative information-sharing process regardless of
their self-centered evaluations.
More specifically, we study the behavior of multi-agent
networks where information-sharing is subject to a positive
communication cost over the edges linking the agents. This
situation is common in applications, such as information
sharing over cognitive networks [21], online learning under
communication bandwidth and/or latency constraints [22],
[23, Ch. 14], and over social learning networks when the
delivery of opinions involves some costs such as messaging
fees [24]–[26]. In our network model, each agent is self-
interested and seeks to minimize its own sharing cost and
estimation error. Motivated by the practical scenario studied
in [21], we formulate a general mean-square error estimation
problem where all agents are interested in estimating the same
target parameter vector. Agents are assumed to be foresighted
and to have bounded rationality [27] in the manner defined
further ahead in the article. Then, we show that if left unat-
tended, the dominant strategy for all agents is for them not
to participate in the sharing of information, which leads to
networks operating under an inefficient Pareto condition. This
situation arises because agents do not have enough information
to tell beforehand if their paired neighbors will reciprocate
their actions (i.e., if an agent shares data with a second agent,
will the second agent reciprocate and share data back?) This
prediction-deficiency problem follows from the fact that agents
are not using historical data to predict other agents’ actions.
One method to deal with this inefficient scenario is to
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2assume that agents adapt to their opponents’ strategies and
improve returns by forming some regret measures. In [28], a
decision maker determines its action using a regret measure to
evaluate the utility loss from the chosen action to the optimal
action in the previous stage game. For multi-agent networks,
a regret-based algorithm was proposed in [20] and [29] for
agents to update their actions based on a weighted loss of the
utility functions from the previous stage games. However, these
works assume myopic agents and formulate repeated games
with fixed utility functions over each stage game, which is
different from the scenario considered in this article where
the benefit of sharing information over adaptive networks con-
tinually evolves over time. This is because, as the estimation
accuracy improves and/or the communication cost becomes
expensive, the return to continue cooperating for estimation
purposes falls and thus the act of cooperating with other agents
becomes unattractive and inefficient. In this case, the regret
measures computed from the previous stage games may not
provide an accurate reference to the current stage game.
A second useful method to deal with Pareto inefficient and
non-cooperative scenarios is to employ reputation schemes
(e.g., [30]–[33]). In this method, foresighted agents use rep-
utation scores to assess the willingness of other agents to
cooperate; the scores are also used to punish non-cooperative
behavior. For example, the works [31], [32] rely on discrete-
value reputation scores, say, on a scale 1-10, and these scores
are regularly updated according to the agents’ actions. Similar
to the regret learning references mentioned before, in our
problem the utilities or cost functions of stage games change
over time and evolve based on agents’ estimates. Conventional
reputation designs do not address this time variation within
the payoff of agents, which will be examined more closely in
our work. Motivated by these considerations, in Sec. IV, we
propose a dynamic/adaptive reputation protocol that is based
on the belief measure of future actions with real-time benefit
predictions.
In our formulation, we assume a general random-pairing
model similar to [10], where agents are randomly paired at the
beginning of each time interval. This situation could occur, for
example, due to an exogenous matcher or the mobility of the
agents. The paired agents are assumed to follow a diffusion
strategy [12]–[15], which includes an adaptation step and a
consultation step, to iteratively update their estimates. Different
from conventional diffusion strategies, the consultation step
here is influenced by the random-pairing environment and by
cooperation uncertainty. The interactions among self-interested
agents are formulated as successive stage games of two players
using pure strategies. To motivate agents to cooperate with
each other, we formulate an adaptive reputation protocol to
help agents jointly assess the instantaneous benefit of de-
preciating information and the transmission cost of sharing
information. The reputation score helps agents to form a belief
of their opponent’s subsequent actions. Based on this belief,
we entice agents to cooperate and turn their best response
strategy into an action choosing strategy that conforms to
Pareto efficiency and enhances the overall social benefit of
the network.
In the performance evaluation, we are interested in ensuring
the mean-square-error stability of the network instead of exam-
ining equilibria as is common in the game theoretical literature
since our emphasis is on adaptation under successive time-
variant stage games. The performance analysis is challenging
due to the adaptive behavior by the agents. For this reason,
we pursue the mean-square-error analysis of the evolution
of the network over three domains: far-field, near-field, and
middle-field, and show that the network behavior is stable
for sufficiently small step-sizes. We also show that when
information sharing becomes costly, the expected social benefit
of the proposed reputation protocol outperforms the social
benefit that is obtained by cooperative agents that always share
data.
Notation: We use lowercase letters to denote vectors and
scalars, uppercase letters for matrices, plain letters for deter-
ministic variables, and boldface letters for random variables.
All vectors in our treatment are column vectors, with the
exception of the regression vectors, uk,i.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Distributed Optimization and Communication Cost
Consider a connected network consisting of N agents.
When agents act independently of each other, each agent k
would seek to estimate the M × 1 vector wo that minimizes
an individual estimation cost function denoted by J estk (w) :
CM → R. We assume each of the costs {J estk (w)} is strongly
convex for k = 1, 2, . . . , N , and that all agents have the
same objective so that all costs are minimized at the common
location wo ∈ CM×1.
In this work, we are interested in scenarios where agents can
be motivated to cooperate among themselves as permitted by
the network topology. We associate an extended cost function
with each agent k, and denote it by Jk(w, ak). In this new
cost, the scalar ak is a binary variable that is used to model
whether agent k is willing to cooperate and share information
with its neighbors. The value ak = 1 means that agent k is
willing to share information (e.g., its estimate of wo) with
its neighbors, while the value ak = 0 means that agent k is
not willing to share information. The reason why agents may
or may not share information is because this decision will
generally entail some cost. We consider the scenario where a
positive transmission cost, ck > 0, is required for each act by
agent k involving sharing an estimate with any of its neighbors.
By taking ck into consideration, the extended cost Jk(w, a)
that is now associated with agent k will consist of the sum of
two components: the estimation cost and the communication
cost1:
Jk(w, ak) , J estk (w) + J comk (ak) (1)
where the latter component is modeled as
J comk (ak) , akck (2)
1We focus on the sum of the estimation cost and the communication cost
due to its simplicity and meaningfulness in applications. Note that a possible
generalization is to consider a penalty-based objective function Jestk (w) +
p(Jcomk (ak)) for some penalty function p(·).
3We express the communication expense in the form (2) be-
cause, as described further ahead, when an agent k decides
to share information, it will be sharing the information with
one neighbor at a time; the cost for this communication will be
akck. With regards to the estimation cost, J estk (w), this measure
can be selected in many ways. One common choice is the
mean-square-error (MSE) cost, which we adopt in this work.
At each time instant i ≥ 0, each agent k is assumed to
have access to a scalar measurement dk(i) ∈ C and a 1 ×
M regression vector uk,i ∈ C1×M with covariance matrix
Ru,k , Eu∗k,iuk,i > 0. The regressors {uk,i} are assumed
to have zero-mean and to be temporally white and spatially
independent, i.e.,
Eu∗k,iu`,j = Ru,kδk`δij (3)
in terms of the Kronecker delta function. The data
{dk(i),uk,i} are assumed to be related via the linear regres-
sion model:
dk(i) = uk,iw
o + vk(i) (4)
where wo is the common target vector to be estimated by the
agents. In (4), the variable vk(i) ∈ C is a zero-mean white-
noise process with power σ2v,k that is assumed to be spatially
independent, i.e.,
Ev∗k(i)v`(j) = σ2v,kδk`δij (5)
We further assume that the random processes uk,i and v`(i)
are spatially and temporally independent for any k, `, i, and
j. Models of the form (4) are common in many applications,
e.g., channel estimation, model fitting, target tracking, etc (see,
e.g., [15]).
Let wk,i−1 denote the estimator for wo that will be available
to agent k at time i − 1. We will describe in the sequel how
agents evaluate these estimates. The corresponding a-priori
estimation error is defined by
ea,k(i) , dk(i)− uk,iwk,i−1 (6)
and it measures how close the weight estimate matches the
measurements {dk(i),uk,i} to each other. In view of model
(4), we can also write
ea,k(i) = uk,iw˜k,i−1 + vk(i) (7)
in terms of the estimation error vector
w˜k,i−1 , wo −wk,i−1 (8)
Motivated by these expressions and model (4), the instanta-
neous MSE cost that is associated with agent k based on the
estimate from time i− 1 is given by
J estk (wk,i−1) , E|ea,k(i)|2
= E|dk(i)− uk,iwk,i−1|2
= E‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k + σ2v,k (9)
Note that this MSE cost conforms to the strong convexity of
J estk as we mentioned before. Combined with the action by
agent k, the extended instantaneous cost at agent k that is
based on the prior estimate, wk,i−1, is then given by:
Jk(wk,i−1, ak) = E|ea,k(i)|2 + akck (10)
B. Random-Pairing Model
We denote by Nk the neighborhood of each agent k, includ-
ing itself. We consider a random pairing protocol for agents
to share information at the beginning of every iteration cycle.
The pairing procedure can be executed either in a centralized
or distributed manner. Centralized pairing schemes can be used
when an online server randomly assigns its clients into pairs
as in crowdsourcing applications [31], [32], or when a base-
station makes pairing decisions for its mobile nodes for packet
relaying [34]. Distributed paring schemes arise more naturally
in the context of economic and market transactions [35]. In our
formulation, we adopt a distributed pairing structure that takes
neighborhoods into account when selecting pairs, as explained
next.
We assume each agent k has bi-directional links to other
agents in Nk and that agent k has a positive probability to be
paired with any of its neighbors. Once two agents are paired,
they can decide on whether to share or not their instantaneous
estimates for wo. We therefore model the result of the random-
pairing process between each pair of agents k and ` ∈ Nk\{k}
as temporally-independent Bernoulli random processes defined
as:
1k`(i) = 1`k(i) =
{
1, with probability pk` = p`k
0, otherwise
(11)
where 1k`(i) = 1 indicates that agents k and ` are paired at
time i and 1k`(i) = 0 indicates that they are not paired. We are
setting 1k`(i) = 1`k(i) because these variables represent the
same event: whether agents k and ` are paired, which results
in pk` = p`k. For ` /∈ Nk, we have 1k`(i) = 0 since such pairs
will never occur. For convenience, we use 1kk(i) to indicate
the event that agent k is not paired with any agent ` ∈ Nk \
{k} at time i, which happens with probability pkk. Since each
agent will pair itself with at most one agent at a time from its
neighborhood, the following properties are directly obtained
from the random-pairing procedure:∑
`∈Nk
1k`(i) = 1,
∑
`∈Nk
pk` = 1 (12)
1k`(i)1kq(i) = 0, for ` 6= q (13)
We assume that the random pairing indicators {1k`(i)} for all
k and ` are independent of the random variables {uk,t} and
{vk(t)} for any time i and t. For example, a widely used
setting in the literature is the fully-pairing network, which
assumes a fully-connected network topology [32], [36], i.e.,
Nk = N for every agent k, where N denotes the set of
all agents. The size N = |N | is assumed to be even and
every agent is uniformly paired with exactly one agent in the
network. Therefore, we have N/2 pairs at each time instant
and the random-pairing probability becomes
pk` =
{
1
N−1 , for ` 6= k
0, for ` = k
(14)
We will not be assuming fully-connected networks or fully-
paired protocols and will deal more generally with networks
that can be sparsely connected. Later in Sec. IV we will
4demonstrate a simple random-pairing protocol which can be
implemented in a fully distributed manner.
C. Diffusion Strategy
Conventional diffusion strategies assume that the agents are
cooperative (or obedient) and continuously share information
with their neighbors as necessary [12], [13], [15]. In the adapt-
then-combine (ATC) version of diffusion adaptation, each
agent k updates its estimate, wk,i, according to the following
relations:
ψk,i = wk,i−1 + µu∗k,i[dk(i)− uk,iwk,i−1] (15)
wk,i =
∑
`∈Nk
α`kψ`,i (16)
where µ > 0 is the step-size parameter of agent k, and the
{α`k, ` ∈ Nk} are nonnegative combination coefficients that
add up to one. In implementation (15)–(16), each agent k
computes an intermediate estimate ψk,i using its local data,
and subsequently fuses the intermediate estimates from its
neighbors. For the combination step (16), since agent k is
allowed to interact with only one of its neighbors, then we
rewrite (16) in terms of a single coefficient 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1 as
follows:
wk,i =
{
αkψk,i + (1− αk)ψ`,i, if 1k`(i) = 1 for some ` 6= k
ψk,i, otherwise
(17)
We can capture both situations in (17) in a single equation as
follows:
wk,i = αkψk,i + (1− αk)
∑
`∈Nk
1k`(i)ψ`,i (18)
In formulation (15) and (18), it is assumed that once agents k
and ` are paired, they share information according to (18).
Let us now incorporate an additional layer into the algorithm
in order to model instances of selfish behavior. When agents
behave in a selfish (strategic) manner, even when agents k and
` are paired, each one of them may still decide (independently)
to refuse to share information with the other agent for selfish
reasons (for example, agent k may decide that this cooperation
will cost more than the benefit it will reap for the estimation
task). To capture this behavior, we use the specific notation
ak`(i), instead of ak(i), to represent the action taken by
agent k on agent ` at time i, and similarly for a`k(i). Both
agents will end up sharing information with each other only if
ak`(i) = a`k(i) = 1, i.e., only when both agents are in favor
of cooperating once they have been paired. We set akk(i) = 1
for every time i. We can now rewrite the combination step
(18) more generally as:
wk,i = αkψk,i + (1− αk)
∑
`∈Nk
1k`(i)[a`k(i)ψ`,i+
(1− a`k(i))ψk,i]
(19)
From (19), when agent k is not paired with any agent at time
i (1kk(i) = 1), we get wk,i = ψk,i. On the other hand, when
agent k is paired with some neighboring agent `, which means
1k`(i) = 1, we get
wk,i = αkψk,i + (1− αk) [a`k(i)ψ`,i + (1− a`k(i))ψk,i]
(20)
It is then clear that a`k(i) = 0 results in wk,i = ψk,i, while
a`k(i) = 1 results in a combination of the estimates of agents
k and `. In other words, when 1k`(i) = 1:
wk,i =
{
ψk,i, if a`k(i) = 0
αkψk,i + (1− αk)ψ`,i, if a`k(i) = 1 (21)
In the sequel, we assume that agents update and combine
their estimates using (15) and (19). One important question
to address is how the agents determine their actions {ak`(i)}.
III. AGENT INTERACTIONS
When an arbitrary agent k needs to decide on whether to
set its action to ak`(i) = 1 (i.e., to cooperate) or ak`(i) =
0 (i.e., not to cooperate), it generally cannot tell beforehand
whether agent ` will reciprocate. In this section, we first show
that when self-interested agents are boundedly rational and
incapable of transforming the past actions of neighbors into a
prediction of their future actions, then the dominant strategy for
each agent will be to choose noncooperation. Consequently, the
entire network becomes noncooperative. Later, in Sec. IV, we
explain how to address this inefficient scenario by proposing
a protocol that will encourage cooperation.
A. Long-Term Discounted Cost Function
To begin with, let us examine the interaction between a
pair of agents, such as k and `, at some time instant i
(1k`(i) = 1). We assume that agents k and ` simultaneously
select their actions ak`(i) and a`k(i) by using some pure
strategies (i.e., agents set their action variables by using data
or realizations that are available to them, such as the estimates
{wk,i−1,w`,i−1}, rather than select their actions according
to some probability distributions)2. The criterion for setting
ak`(i) by agent k is to optimize agent k’s payoff, which
incorporates both the estimation cost, affected by agent `’s
own action a`k(i), and the communication cost, determined
by agent k’s action ak`(i). Therefore, the instantaneous cost
incurred by agent k is a mapping function from the action
space (ak`(i),a`k(i)) to a real value. In order to account for
selfish behavior, we need to modify the notation used in (1)
to incorporate the actions of both agents k and `. In this way,
we need to denote the value of the cost incurred by agent k
at time i, after wk,i−1 is updated to wk,i, more explicitly by
2In our scenario, the discrete action set ak`(i) ∈ {0, 1} will be shown to
lead to threshold-based pure strategies — see Sec. IV-B.
5Jk(ak`(i),a`k(i)) and it is given by:
Jk(ak`(i),a`k(i))
=

J estk (wk,i = ψk,i), if (0, 0)
J estk (wk,i = αkψk,i + (1− αk)ψ`,i), if (0, 1)
J estk (wk,i = ψk,i) + ck, if (1, 0)
J estk (wk,i = αkψk,i + (1− αk)ψ`,i) + ck, if (1, 1)
(22)
For example, the first line on the right-hand side of (22)
corresponds to the situation in which none of the agents
decides to cooperate. In that case, agent k can only rely on its
intermediate estimate, ψk,i, to improve its estimation accuracy.
In comparison, the second line in (22) corresponds to the
situation in which agent ` is willing to share its estimate but
not agent k. In this case, agent k is able to perform the second
combination step in (21) and enhance its estimation accuracy.
In the third line in (22), agent ` does not cooperate while agent
k does. In this case, agent k incurs a communication cost, ck.
Similarly, for the last line in (22), both agents cooperate. In
this case, agent k is able to perform the second step in (21)
while incurring a cost ck.
We can write (22) more compactly as follows:
Jk(ak`(i),a`k(i)) = J
act
k (a`k(i)) + ak`(i)ck (23)
where we introduced
J actk (a`k(i))
,
{
J estk (wk,i = ψk,i), if a`k(i) = 0
J estk (wk,i = αkψk,i + (1− αk)ψ`,i), if a`k(i) = 1
(24)
The function J actk (a`k(i)) helps make explicit the influence
of the action by agent ` on the estimation accuracy that is
ultimately attained by agent k.
Now, the random-pairing process occurs repeatedly over
time and, moreover, agents may leave the network. For this
reason, rather than rely on the instantaneous cost function in
(22), agent k will determine its action at time i by instead
minimizing an expected long-term discounted cost function of
the form defined by (25) where δk ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor
to model future network uncertainties and the foresightedness
level of agent k. The expectation is taken over all randomness
for t ≥ i and is conditioned on the estimate wk,i−1 when
the actions ak`(i) and a`k(i) are selected. Formulation (25)
is meant to assess the influence of the action selected at time
i by agent k on its cumulative (but discounted) future costs.
More specifically, whenever 1k`(i) = 1, agent k selects its
action ak`(i) at time i to minimize the expected long-term
discounted cost given wk,i−1:
min
ak`(i)∈{0,1}
J∞k,i[ak`(i), a`k(i)|wk,i−1] (26)
Based on the payoff function in (25), we can formally regard
the interaction between agents as consisting of stage games
with recurrent random pairing. The stage information-sharing
game for 1k`(i) = 1 is a tuple (N,A,J), where N , {k, `} is
the set of players, and A , Ak ×A` is the Cartesian product
of binary sets Ak = A` , {1, 0} representing available
actions for agents k and `, respectively. The action profile is
a(i) , (ak`(i), a`k(i)) ∈ A. Moreover, J = {J∞k,i, J∞`,i} is
the set of real-valued long-term costs defined over A → R
for agents k and `, respectively. We remark that since J∞k,i
depends on wk,i−1, its value generally varies from stage to
stage. As a result, each agent k faces a dynamic game structure
with repeated interactions in contrast to conventional repeated
games as in [37], [38] where the game structure is fixed over
time. Time variation is an essential feature that arises when
we examine selfish behavior over adaptive networks.
Therefore, solving problem (26) involves the forecast of
future game structures and future actions chosen by the op-
ponent. These two factors are actually coupled and influence
each other; this fact makes prediction under such conditions
rather challenging. To continue with the analysis, we adopt
a common assumption from the literature that agents have
computational constraints. In particular, we assume the agents
have bounded rationality [27], [39], [40]. In our context, this
means that the agents have limited capability to forecast future
game structures and are therefore obliged to assume that future
parameters remain unchanged at current values. We will show
how this assumption enables each agent k to evaluate J∞k,i in
later discussions.
Assumption 1 (Bounded rationality): Every agent k solves
the optimization problem (26) under the assumptions:
wk,t = wk,i−1, 1k`(t) = 1k`(i), for t ≥ i (27)

We note that the above assumption is only made by the agent
at time i while solving problem (26); the actual estimates wk,t
and pairing choices 1k`(t) will continue to evolve over time.
We further assume that the bounded rationality assumption is
common knowledge to all agents in the network3.
3Common knowledge of p means that each agent knows p, each agent
knows that all other agents know p, each agent knows that all other agents
know that all the agents know p, and so on [41].
J∞k,i [ak`(i), a`k(i)|wk,i−1] ,
∞∑
t=i
δt−ik E
[
Jk(ak`(t),a`k(t))
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = ak`(i),a`k(i) = a`k(i)]
=
∞∑
t=i
δt−ik E
[
J actk (a`k(t)) + ak`(t)ck
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = ak`(i),a`k(i) = a`k(i)] (25)
6TABLE I. THE EXPECTED LONG-TERM COST FUNCTIONS J1k,i AND J
1
`,i .
`````````Agent `
Agent k
ak`(i) = 0 ak`(i) = 1
a`k(i) = 0
E[Jact` (ak`(i) = 0)|w`,i−1]
E[Jactk (a`k(i) = 0)|wk,i−1]
E[Jact` (ak`(i) = 1)|w`,i−1]
E[Jactk (a`k(i) = 0)|wk,i−1] + ck
a`k(i) = 1
E[Jact` (ak`(i) = 0)|w`,i−1] + c`
E[Jactk (a`k(i) = 1)|wk,i−1]
E[Jact` (ak`(i) = 1)|w`,i−1] + c`
E[Jactk (a`k(i) = 1)|wk,i−1] + ck
B. Pareto Inefficiency
In this section, we show that if no further measures are
taken, then Pareto inefficiency may occur. Thus, assume that
the agents are unable to store the history of their actions and
the actions of their neighbors. Each agent k only has access
to its immediate estimate wk,i−1, which can be interpreted as
a state variable at time i − 1 for agent k. In this case, each
agent k will need to solve (26) under Assumption 1. It then
follows that agent k will predict the same action for future
time instants:
ak`(t) = ak`(i), for t > i (28)
Furthermore, since the bounded rationality condition is com-
mon knowledge, agent k knows that the same future actions
are used by agent `, i.e.,
a`k(t) = a`k(i), for t > i (29)
Using (28) and (29), agent k obtains
J∞k,i [ak`(i), a`k(i)|wk,i−1]
=
∞∑
t=i
δt−ik E
[
Jk(ak`(i), a`k(i))
∣∣∣wk,i−1]
=
1
1− δk · E
[
Jk(ak`(i), a`k(i))
∣∣∣wk,i−1]
=
1
1− δk
(
E[J actk (a`k(i))|wk,i−1] + ak`(i)ck
)
(30)
Therefore, the optimization problem (26) reduces to the fol-
lowing minimization problem:
min
ak`(i)∈{0,1}
J1k,i (ak`(i), a`k(i)) (31)
where
J1k,i (ak`(i), a`k(i)) , E[J actk (a`k(i))|wk,i−1] + ak`(i)ck (32)
is the expected cost of agent k given wk,i−1 — compare
with (23). Table I summarizes the values of J1k,i and J
1
`,i for
both agents under their respective actions. From the entries
in the table, we conclude that choosing action ak`(i) = 0
is the dominant strategy for agent k regardless of the action
chosen by agent ` because its cost will be the smallest it can
be in that situation. Likewise, the dominant strategy for agent
` is a`k(i) = 0 regardless of the action chosen by agent k.
Therefore, the action profile (ak`(i), a`k(i)) = (0, 0) is the
unique outcome as a Nash and dominant strategy equilibrium
for every stage game.
However, this resulting action profile will be Pareto ineffi-
cient for both agents if it can be verified that the alternative
action profile (1, 1), where both agents cooperate, can lead to
improved payoff values for both agents in comparison to the
strategy (0, 0). To characterize when this is possible, let us
denote the expected payoff for agent k when agent ` selects
a`k(i) = 0 by
s0k,i(ak`(i)) , E[J actk (a`k(i) = 0)|wk,i−1] + ak`(i)ck (33)
Likewise, when a`k(i) = 1, we denote the expected payoff for
agent k by
s1k,i(ak`(i)) , E[J actk (a`k(i) = 1)|wk,i−1] + ak`(i)ck (34)
The benefit for agent k from agent `’s sharing action, defined
as the improvement from s0k,i(ak`(i)) to s
1
k,i(ak`(i)), is seen
to be independent of ak`(i):
bk(i)
, s0k,i(ak`(i))− s1k,i(ak`(i))
= E[J actk (a`k(i) = 0)|wk,i−1]− E[J actk (a`k(i) = 1)|wk,i−1]
= E
[
J estk (wk,i = ψk,i) |wk,i−1
]
− E [J estk (wk,i = αkψk,i + (1− αk)ψ`,i) |wk,i−1] (35)
Now, note from definition (6) that
E
[
J estk (wk,i)|wk,i−1
]
= E
[
|dk(i+ 1)− uk,i+1wk,i|2
∣∣∣wk,i−1] (36)
so that
E[J actk (a`k(i) = 0)|wk,i−1]
= E
[
J estk (wk,i = ψk,i) |wk,i−1
]
= E
[
|dk(i+ 1)− uk,i+1ψk,i|2
∣∣∣wk,i−1]
= E
[
|uk,i+1ψ˜k,i + vk(i+ 1)|2
∣∣∣wk,i−1]
= E
[
‖ψ˜k,i‖2Ru,k
∣∣∣wk,i−1]+ σ2v,k (37)
where ψ˜k,i , wo −ψk,i and, similarly,
E[J actk (a`k(i) = 1)|wk,i−1]
= E
[
J estk (wk,i = αkψk,i + (1− αk)ψ`,i) |wk,i−1
]
= E
[
‖αkψ˜k,i + (1− αk)ψ˜`,i‖2Ru,k
∣∣∣wk,i−1]+ σ2v,k (38)
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the behavior of the payoffs in terms of the size of the benefit-cost ratios (“S” and “NS” refer to the actions “share” and “do not share”,
respectively).
Then, the benefit bk(i) becomes
bk(i) = E
[
‖ψ˜k,i‖2Ru,k
∣∣∣wk,i−1]
− E
[
‖αkψ˜k,i + (1− αk)ψ˜`,i‖2Ru,k
∣∣∣wk,i−1] (39)
Note that bk(i) is determined by the variable wk,i−1 and does
not depend on the actions a`k(i) and ak`(i). We will explain
how agents assess the information bk(i) to choose actions
further ahead in Sec. IV-C. Now, let us define the benefit-cost
ratio as the ratio of the estimation benefit to the communication
cost:
γk(i) ,
bk(i)
ck
(40)
Then, the action profile (1, 1) in the game defined in Table I
is Pareto superior to the action profile (0, 0) when both of the
following two conditions hold
γk(i) > 1 and γ`(i) > 1 ⇔
{
ck < bk(i)
c` < b`(i)
(41)
On the other hand, the action profile (0, 0) is Pareto superior
to the action profile (1, 1) if, and only if,
γk(i) < 1 and γ`(i) < 1 (42)
In Fig. 1(a), we illustrate how the values of the payoffs com-
pare to each other when (41) holds for the four possibilities of
action profiles. It is seen from this figure that when γk(i) > 1
and γ`(i) > 1, the action profile (S,S), i.e., (1, 1) in (32), is
Pareto optimal and that the dominant strategy (NS,NS), i.e.,
(0, 0) in (32), is inefficient and leads to worse performance
(which is a manifestation of the famous prisoner’s dilemma
problem [42]). On the other hand, if γk(i) < 1 and γ`(i) < 1,
then we are led to Fig. 1(b), where the action profile (NS,NS)
becomes Pareto optimal and superior to (S,S). We remark that
(NS,S) and (S,NS) are also Pareto optimal in both cases but
not preferred in this work because they are only beneficial for
one single agent.
IV. ADAPTIVE REPUTATION PROTOCOL DESIGN
As shown above, when both γk(i) > 1 and γ`(i) > 1,
the Pareto optimal strategies for agents k and ` correspond
to cooperation; when both γk(i) < 1 and γ`(i) < 1, the
Pareto optimal strategies for agents k and ` reduce to non-
cooperation. Since agents are self-interested and boundedly
rational, we showed earlier that if left without incentives, their
dominant strategy is to avoid sharing information because they
cannot tell beforehand if their paired neighbor will reciprocate.
This Pareto inefficiency therefore arises from the fact that
agents are not using historical data to predict other agents’
actions. We now propose a reputation protocol to summarize
the opponent’s past actions into a reputation score. The score
will help agents to form a belief of their opponent’s subsequent
actions. Based on this belief, we will be able to provide
agents with a measure that entices them to cooperate. We
will show, for example, that the best response rule for agents
will be to cooperate whenever γk(i) is large and not to
cooperate whenever γk(i) is small, in conformity with the
Pareto-efficient design.
A. Reputation Protocol
Reputation scores have been used before in the literature as
a mechanism to encourage cooperation [32], [43], [44]. Agents
that cooperate are rewarded with higher scores; agents that do
not cooperate are penalized with lower scores. For example,
eBay uses a cumulative score mechanism, which simply sums
the sellers feedback scores from all previous periods to pro-
vide buyers and sellers with trust evaluation [45]. Likewise,
Amazon.com implements a reputation system by using an
average score mechanism that averages the feedback scores
from the previous periods [46]. However, as already explained
8in [44], cheating can occur over time in both cumulative and
average score mechanisms because past scores carry a large
weight in determining the current reputation. To overcome this
problem, and in a manner similar to exponential weighting in
adaptive filter designs [47], an exponentially-weighted moving
average mechanism that gives higher weights to more recent
actions is discussed in [44]. We follow a similar weighting
formulation, with the main difference being that the reputation
scores now need to be adapted in response to the evolution of
the estimation task over the network. The construction can be
described as follows.
When 1k`(i) = 1, meaning that agent k is paired with agent
`, the reputation score θ`k(i) ∈ [0, 1] that is maintained by
agent k for its neighbor ` is updated as:
θ`k(i+ 1) = rkθ`k(i) + (1− rk)a`k(i) (43)
where rk ∈ (0, 1) is a smoothing factor for agent k to control
the dynamics of the reputation updates. On the other hand, if
1k`(i) = 0, the reputation score θ`k(i+ 1) remains as θ`k(i).
We can compactly describe the reputation rule as
θ`k(i+ 1) = 1k`(i) [rkθ`k(i) + (1− rk)a`k(i)]
+ (1− 1k`(i))θ`k(i) (44)
Directly applying the above reputation formulation, however,
can cause a loss in adaptation ability over the network.
For example, the network would become permanently non-
cooperative when agent ` chooses a`k(i) = 0 for long con-
secutive iterations. That is because, in that case, the reputation
score θ`k(i) will decay exponentially to zero, which keeps
agent k from choosing ak`(i) = 1 in the future. In order to
avoid this situation, we set a lowest value for the reputation
score to a small positive threshold 0 < ε 1, i.e.,
θ`k(i+ 1) = 1k`(i) ·max{rkθ`k(i) + (1− rk)a`k(i), ε}
+ (1− 1k`(i))θ`k(i) (45)
and thus θ`k(i) ∈ [ε, 1].
The reputation scores can now be utilized to evaluate the
belief by agent k of subsequent actions by agent `. To explain
how this can be done, we argue that agent k would expect
the probability of a`k(t) = 1, i.e., the probability that agent
` is willing to cooperate, to be an increasing function of both
θ`k(t) and θk`(t) for t ≥ i. Specifically, if we denote this
belief probability by B(a`k(t) = 1), then it is expected to
satisfy:
∂B(a`k(t) = 1)
∂θ`k(t)
≥ 0, ∂B(a`k(t) = 1)
∂θk`(t)
≥ 0 (46)
The first property is motivated by the fact that according to
the history of actions, a higher value for θ`k(t) indicates that
agent ` has higher willingness to share estimates. The second
property is motivated by the fact that lower values for θk`(t)
mean that agent k has rarely shared estimates with agent `
in the recent past. Therefore, it can be expected that agent
` will have lower willingness to share information for lower
values of θk`(t). Based on this argument, we suggest a first-
order construction for measuring belief with respect to both
θ`k(t) and θk`(t) as follows (other constructions are of course
possible; our intent is to keep the complexity of the solution
low while meeting the desired objectives):
B(a`k(t) = 1) = θk`(t) · θ`k(t), t ≥ i (47)
which satisfies both properties in (46) and where B(a`k(t) =
1) ∈ [ε2, 1]. Therefore, the reputation protocol implements
(45) and (47) repeatedly. Each agent k will then employ the
reference knowledge Ki , {θk`(i),θ`k(i), B(a`k(i) = 1)} to
select its action ak`(i) as described next.
B. Best Response Rule
The belief measure (47) provides agent k with additional
information about agent `’s actions. That is, with (47), agent
k can treat a`k(t) as a random variable with distribution
B(a`k(t) = 1) for t ≥ i. Then, the best response of agent
k is obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
min
ak`(i)∈{0,1}
J∞
′
k,i [ak`(i)|wk,i−1] (48)
where J∞
′
k,i [ak`(i)|wk,i−1] is defined by (49) and involves
an additional expectation over the distribution of a`k(t) —
compare with (25). Similarly to Assumption 1, we assume
the bounded rationality of the agents extends to the reputation
scores θ`k(t) for t ≥ i.
Assumption 2 (Extended bounded rationality): We extend
the assumption of bounded rationality from (27) to also in-
clude:
θ`k(t) = θ`k(i), for t ≥ i (50)

Now, using pure strategies, the best response of agent k is to
select the action ak`(i) such that
ak`(i) =

1, if J∞
′
k,i [ak`(i) = 1|wk,i−1]
< J∞
′
k,i [ak`(i) = 0|wk,i−1]
0, otherwise
(51)
J∞
′
k,i [ak`(i)|wk,i−1] =
∞∑
t=i
δt−ik E
[
J actk (a`k(t)) + ak`(t)ck
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = ak`(i),Ki]
=E
[
J actk (a`k(i))
∣∣∣wk,i−1,Ki]+ak`(i)ck + ∞∑
t=i+1
δt−ik E
[
J actk (a`k(t)) + ak`(t)ck
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = ak`(i),Ki]
(49)
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depends on the benefit-cost ratio γk(i) and the communication
cost ck:
Lemma 1: With Assumptions 1 and 2, the best response rule
fk(·) becomes
ak`(i) =
{
1, if γk(i) , bk(i)ck >
χk
θ`k(i)
0, otherwise
(52)
where
χk ,
1− δkrk
δk(1− rk) (53)
Proof: See Appendix A.
We note that the resulting rule aligns the agents to achieve
the Pareto optimal strategy: to share information when γk(i)
is sufficiently large and not to share information when γk(i)
is small.
C. Benefit Prediction
To compute the benefit-cost ratio γk(i) = bk(i)/ck, the
agent still needs to know bk(i) defined by (35), which
depends on the quantities E[J actk (a`k(i) = 0)|wk,i−1] and
E[J actk (a`k(i) = 1)|wk,i−1]. It is common in the literature, as
in [29], [48], to assume that agents have complete information
about the payoff functions like the ones shown in Table I.
However, in the context of adaptive networks where agents
have only access to data realizations and not to their statistical
distributions, the payoffs are unknown and need to be estimated
or predicted. For example, in our case, the convex combination
αkψk,i + (1−αk)ψ`,i is unknown for agent k before agent `
shares ψ`,i with it. We now describe one way by which agent
k can predict bk(i); other ways are possible depending on how
much information is available to the agent. Let us assume a
special type of agents, which are called risk-taking [49]: agent
k chooses ak`(i) = 1 as long as the largest achievable benefit,
denoted by b¯k(i), exceeds the threshold:
ak`(i) =
{
1, if b¯k(i)ck >
χk
θ`k(i)
0, otherwise
(54)
Using (39), the largest achievable benefit b¯k(i) can be found
by solving the following optimization problem:
b¯k(i) , max
ψ˜`,i
bk(i)
= max
ψ˜`,i
{
E
[
‖ψ˜k,i‖2Ru,k
∣∣∣wk,i−1]
− E
[
‖αkψ˜k,i + (1− αk)ψ˜`,i‖2Ru,k
∣∣∣wk,i−1]}
= E
[
‖ψ˜k,i‖2Ru,k
∣∣∣wk,i−1] (55)
since the maximum occurs when
ψ˜`,i = − αk
1− αk ψ˜k,i (56)
Let us express the adaptation step (15) in terms of the
estimation error as
ψ˜k,i = (I − µu∗k,iuk,i)w˜k,i−1 − µu∗k,ivk(i) (57)
To continue, we assume that the step-size µ is sufficiently
small. Then,
E
[
‖ψ˜k,i‖2Ru,k
∣∣∣wk,i−1]
= E
[
‖(I − µu∗k,iuk,i)w˜k,i−1 − µu∗k,ivk(i)‖2Ru,k
∣∣∣wk,i−1]
= E
[
w˜∗k,i−1(I − µu∗k,iuk,i)Ru,k(I − µu∗k,iuk,i)
× w˜k,i−1
∣∣∣wk,i−1]+ µ2Tr(R2u,k)σ2v,k
= w˜∗k,i−1Ωkw˜k,i−1 +O(µ
2) (58)
where we are collecting terms that are second-order in the step-
size into the factor O(µ2),4 and where we introduced Ωk ,
Ru,k(I − 2µRu,k). We note that for sufficiently small step-
sizes:
Ω′k , Ru,k(I − µRu,k)2 ≈ Ru,k(I − 2µRu,k) = Ωk (59)
Therefore, each agent k can approximate b¯k(i) as
b¯k(i) = w˜
∗
k,i−1Ω
′
kw˜k,i−1
= w˜∗k,i−1Ru,k(I − µRu,k)2w˜k,i−1
= ‖(I − µRu,k)w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k (60)
D. Real-Time Implementation
Expression (60) is still not useful for agents because it
requires knowledge of both Ru,k and w˜k,i−1. With regards
to Ru,k, we can use the instantaneous approximation Ru,k ≈
u∗k,iuk,i to get
b¯k(i) ≈ w˜∗k,i−1u∗k,iuk,i(I − µu∗k,iuk,i)2w˜k,i−1
= (1− µ‖uk,i‖2)2w˜∗k,i−1u∗k,iuk,iw˜k,i−1 (61)
With regards to w˜k,i−1, we assume that agents use a moving-
average filter as in [50] to approximate wo iteratively as
follows:
ŵok,i = (1− ν)ŵok,i−1 + νψk,i (62)
w˜k,i−1 ≈ ŵok,i −wk,i−1 (63)
where ν ∈ (0, 1) is a positive forgetting factor close to 0 to give
higher weights on recent results. We summarize the operation
of the resulting algorithm in the following listing.
4This approximation simplifies the algorithm construction. However, when
we study the network performance later in (74) we shall keep the second-order
terms.
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Algorithm 1 Diffusion Strategy with an Adaptive Reputation
Scheme.
Let {wk,−1 = 0} and {θk`(−1) = 1} for all k and `. Define χk ,
1−δkrk
δk(1−rk) .
loop
Generate {1k`(i)} for all k and `.
% Stage 1 (Adaptation): For each k:
ψk,i = wk,i−1 + µu∗k,i[dk(i)− uk,iwk,i−1]
b¯k(i) ≈ (1− µ‖uk,i‖2)2w˜∗k,i−1u∗k,iuk,iw˜k,i−1
ŵok,i = (1− ν)ŵok,i−1 + νψk,i
w˜k,i−1 ≈ ŵok,i −wk,i−1
% Stage 2 (Action Selection): For all k and `,
if 1k`(i) = 1 then
ak`(i) =
{
1, if b¯k(i)
ck
> χk
θ`k(i)
0, otherwise
else ak`(i) = 0.
end if
% Stage 3 (Reputation Update): For all k and `,
θ`k(i+ 1) =1k`(i) ·max{rkθ`k(i) + (1− rk)a`k(i), ε}
+ (1− 1k`(i))θ`k(i)
% Stage 4 (Combination): For all k,
wk,i = αkψk,i+(1− αk)
∑
`∈Nk
1k`(i)
[
a`k(i)ψ`,i+(1− a`k(i))ψk,i
]
end loop
V. STABILITY ANALYSIS AND LIMITING BEHAVIOR
In this section, we study the stability of Algorithm 1 and its
limiting performance after sufficiently long iterations. In order
to pursue a mathematically tractable analysis, we assume that
the maximum benefit b¯k(i) is estimated rather accurately by
each agent k. That is, instead of the real-time implementation
(61)–(63), we consider (60) that
b¯k(i) = ‖(I − µRu,k)w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k (64)
This consideration is motivated by taking the expectation of
expression (61) given w˜k,i−1:
E
[
(1− µ‖uk,i‖2)2w˜∗k,i−1u∗k,iuk,iw˜k,i−1
∣∣∣w˜k,i−1]
= w˜∗k,i−1
[
Ru,k − 2µE[u∗k,iuk,iu∗k,iuk,i] +O(µ2)
]
w˜k,i−1
(65)
By subtracting (64) from (65), we can see that the difference
between (64) and (65) is at least in the order of µ:
w˜∗k,i−1
[
2µ(R2u,k − E[u∗k,iuk,iu∗k,iuk,i]) +O(µ2)
]
w˜k,i−1
(66)
Therefore, for small enough µ the expected value of the
realization given by (61) approaches the true value (64). The
performance degradation from the real-time implementation
error will be illustrated by numerical simulations in Sec. VI.
Under this condition, and for µ  1, we shall argue that
the operation of each agent is stable in terms of both the
estimation cost and the communication cost. Specifically, for
the estimation cost, we will provide a condition on the step-
size to ensure that the mean-square estimation error of each
agent is asymptotically bounded. Using this result, we will
further show that the communication cost for each agent k,
and which is denoted by J comk , is upper bounded by a constant
value that is unrelated to the transmission cost ck. This result
will be in contrast to the case of always cooperative agents
where J comk will be seen to increase proportionally with ck.
This is because in our case, the probability of cooperation,
Prob{ak`(i) = 1}, will be shown to be upper bounded by
the ratio co/ck for some constant co independent of ck. It will
then follow that when the communication becomes expensive
(large ck), self-interested agents using the adaptive reputation
scheme will become unwilling to cooperate.
A. Estimation Performance
In conventional stability analysis for diffusion strategies, the
combination coefficients are either assumed to be fixed, as
done in [16], [19], [51]–[54], or their expectations conditioned
on the estimates wk,i−1 are assumed to be constant, as in [55].
These conditions are not applicable to our scenario. When
self-interested agents employ the nonlinear threshold-based
action policy (54), the ATC diffusion algorithm (15) and (19)
ends up involving a combination matrix whose entries are
dependent on the estimates wk,i−1 (or the errors w˜k,i−1).
This fact introduces a new challenging aspect into the analysis
of the distributed strategy. In the sequel, and in order to
facilitate the stability and mean-square analysis of the learning
process, we shall examine the performance of the agents in
the network in three operating regions: the far-field region,
the near-field region, and a region in between. We will show
that the evolution of the estimation errors in these operating
regions can be described by the same network error recursion
given further ahead in (99). Following this conclusion, we will
then be able to use (99) to provide general statements about
stability and performance in the three regions.
To begin with, referring to the listing in Algorithm 1,
we start by noting that we write down the following error
recursions for each agent k:
ψ˜k,i = (I − µu∗k,iuk,i)w˜k,i−1 − µu∗k,ivk(i) (67)
w˜k,i =
∑
`∈Nk
g`k(i)ψ˜`,i (68)
where the combination coefficients {g`k(i), ` ∈ Nk} used in
(68) are defined as follows and add up to one:
g`k(i) , (1− αk)1`k(i)a`k(i) ≥ 0 (69)
gkk(i) , 1−
∑
`∈Nk\{k}
g`k(i) ≥ 0 (70)
Note that, in view of the pairing process, at most two of
the coefficients {g`k(i)} in (68) are nonzero in each time
instant. The subsequent performance analysis will depend on
evaluating the squared weighted norm of ψ˜k,i in (67), which
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is seen to be:
‖ψ˜k,i‖2Ru,k = ‖(I − µu∗k,iuk,i)w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k
+ µ2‖vk(i)‖2Tr(u∗k,iuk,iRu,k)
− µw˜∗k,i−1(I − µu∗k,iuk,i)Ru,ku∗k,ivk(i)
− µv∗k(i)uk,iRu,k(I − µu∗k,iuk,i)w˜k,i−1 (71)
Now, from (68) we can use Jensen’s inequality and the
convexity of the squared norm to write
‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k ≤
∑
`∈Nk
g`k(i)‖ψ˜`,i‖2Ru,` (72)
so that, under expectation,
E‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k ≤
∑
`∈Nk
E
[
g`k(i)‖ψ˜`,i‖2Ru,`
]
(73)
We note that g`k(i) is a function of the random variables
{1`k(i),a`k(i)}. The random pairing indicator 1`k(i) is inde-
pendent of u`,i and v`(i). As for a`k(i), which is determined
by b¯`(i) and θk`(i), we can see from expressions (64) and
(45) that both b¯`(i) and θk`(i) only depend on the past data
prior to time i and therefore are independent of u`,i and v`(i).
Consequently, g`k(i) is independent of u`,i and v`(i), and we
get
E
[
g`k(i)‖ψ˜`,i‖2Ru,`
]
= E
[
g`k(i)
(
‖(I − µu∗`,iu`,i)w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
+ µ2‖v`(i)‖2Tr(u∗`,iu`,iRu,`)
− µw˜∗`,i−1(I − µu∗`,iu`,i)Ru,`u∗`,iv`(i)
− µv∗` (i)u`,iRu,`(I − µu∗`,iu`,i)w˜`,i−1
)]
= E
[
g`k(i)‖(I − µu∗`,iu`,i)w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
]
+ µ2Eg`k(i)Tr(R2u,`)σ2v,` (74)
Using the fact that u`,i is independent of g`k(i) and w˜`,i−1,
we get
E
[
g`k(i)‖(I − µu∗`,iu`,i)w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
]
= E
[
E
[
g`k(i)‖(I − µu∗`,iu`,i)w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
∣∣∣g`k(i), w˜`,i−1]]
= E
[
g`k(i)w˜
∗
`,i−1Σ`w˜`,i−1
]
(75)
where
Σ` , E(I − µu∗`,iu`,i)Ru,`(I − µu∗`,iu`,i)
= Ru,` − 2µR2u,` + µ2E(u∗`,iu`,iRu,`u∗`,iu`,i) (76)
If the regression data happens to be circular Gaussian, then a
closed-form expression exists for the last fourth-order moment
term in (76) in terms of Ru,` [47]. We will not assume
Gaussian data. Instead, we will assume that the fourth-order
moment is bounded and that the network is operating in the
slow adaptation regime with a sufficiently small step-size so
that terms that depend on higher-order powers of µ can be
ignored in comparison to other terms. Under this assumption,
we replace (75) by:
E
[
g`k(i)‖(I − µu∗`,iu`,i)w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
]
= E
[
g`k(i)w˜
∗
`,i−1Ω
′
`w˜`,i−1
]
= E
[
g`k(i)b¯`(i)
]
(77)
where Ω′` = Ru,`(I − µRu,`)2 from (59) and b¯`(i) =
w˜∗`,i−1Ω
′
`w˜`,i−1 from (64). Note that
Σ` − Ω′` = O(µ2) (78)
Therefore, expression (74) becomes
E
[
g`k(i)‖ψ˜`,i‖2Ru,`
]
=E
[
g`k(i)b¯`(i)
]
+µ2Tr(R2u,`)σ
2
v,`Eg`k(i)
(79)
To continue, we introduce the following lemma which provides
useful bounds for b¯k(i).
Lemma 2 (Bounds on b¯k(i)): The values of b¯k(i) defined
by (64) are lower and upper bounded by:
ρ2min‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k ≤ b¯k(i) ≤ ρ2max‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k (80)
where
ρmax , max
1≤k≤N
λmax(I − µRu,k) (81)
ρmin , min
1≤k≤N
λmin(I − µRu,k) (82)
Proof: We introduce the eigendecomposition of the co-
variance matrix, Ru,k , UkΛkU∗k , where Uk is a unitary
matrix and Λk , diag{λ1,k, ..., λM,k} is a diagonal matrix
with positive entries. Then, Ru,k can be factored as
Ru,k = R
1
2
u,kR
1
2
u,k (83)
where
R
1
2
u,k , UkΛ
1
2
k U
∗
k , Λ
1
2
k , diag{
√
λ1,k, ...,
√
λM,k} (84)
It is easy to verify that R
1
2
u,k and I − µRu,k are commutable.
Using this property, we obtain the following inequality:
w˜∗k,i−1Ω
′
kw˜k,i−1
= w˜∗k,i−1(I − µRu,k)R
1
2
u,kR
1
2
u,k(I − µRu,k)w˜k,i−1
= w˜∗k,i−1R
1
2
u,k(I − µRu,k)2R
1
2
u,kw˜k,i−1
≤ λmax((I − µRu,k)2)w˜∗k,i−1Ru,kw˜k,i−1
≤ ρ2max‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k (85)
We can obtain the lower bound for b¯k(i) by similar arguments.
Using the upper bound from Lemma 2, we have
E
[
g`k(i)b¯`(i)
]
≤ ρ2maxE
[
g`k(i)‖w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
]
(86)
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Then, from (79) and (86) we deduce from (73) that
E‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k ≤ ρ2max
∑
`∈Nk
E
[
g`k(i)‖w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
]
+ µ2
∑
`∈Nk
Tr(R2u,`)σ
2
v,`Eg`k(i) (87)
From (69)–(70), it is ready to check that {Eg`k(i)} are
nonnegative and add up to 1. Therefore, the second term on
the right-hand side of (87) is a convex combination and has
the following upper bound:
µ2
∑
`∈Nk
Tr(R2u,`)σ
2
v,`Eg`k(i) ≤ µ2κ (88)
where
κ , max
1≤k≤N
Tr(R2u,k)σ
2
v,k (89)
Therefore, we have
E‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k ≤ ρ2max
∑
`∈Nk
E
[
g`k(i)‖w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
]
+ µ2κ
(90)
Since the combination coefficients {g`k(i)} and the estimation
errors {‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k} are related in a nonlinear manner (as re-
vealed by (54, (64), and (69)–(70)), the analysis of Algorithm 1
becomes challenging. To continue, we examine the behavior of
the agents in the three regions of operation mentioned before.
During the initial stage of adaptation, agents are generally
away from the target vector wo and therefore have large
estimation errors. We refer to this domain as the far-field region
of operation, and we will characterize it by the condition:
Far-Field: Prob
{
‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k >
ckχk
ρ2minε
}
> φ (91)
where χk and ρmin are defined in (53) and (82), respectively,
and the parameter φ is close to 1 and in the range of 1 ≥
φ  0. That is, in the far-field regime, the weighted squared
norm of estimation error ‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k exceeds a threshold
with high probability. We note that the far-field condition (91)
can be more easily achieved when ck is small. We also note
that when the event in (91) holds with high-probability, then
agent k is enticed to cooperate since:
‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k >
ckχk
ρ2minε
(a)⇒ b¯k(i)θ`k(i) > ckχk
(b)⇒ ak`(i) = 1 (92)
where step (a) is by (80) and the fact θ`k(i) ∈ [ε, 1], and step
(b) is by (54). Consequently, in the far-field region it holds
with high likelihood that
Prob{ak`(i) = 1} ≈ 1 (93)
This approximation explains the phenomenon that with large
estimation errors, agents are willing to cooperate and share
estimates. We then say that under the far-field condition (91),
the combination coefficients in (69)–(70) can be expressed as
g`k(i) = (1− αk)1`k(i) (94)
gkk(i) = 1−
∑
`∈Nk\{k}
g`k(i)
= αk + (1− αk)1kk(i) (95)
with expectation values as follows:
g`k , Eg`k(i) = (1− αk)p`k
gkk , Egkk(i) = αk + (1− αk)pkk (96)
In this case, expression (90) becomes
E‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k ≤ ρ2max
∑
`∈Nk
g`kE‖w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,` + µ2κ (97)
where we used the independence between 1`k(i) and
‖w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,` . If we stack {‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k} into a vector X i ,
col{‖w˜1,i‖2Ru,1 , ..., ‖w˜N,i‖2Ru,N } and collect the combination
coefficients {g`k} into a left-stochastic matrix G, then we
obtain the network error recursion as:
EX i  ρ2maxGT (EX i−1) + µ2κe (98)
where e ∈ 1N is the vector of all ones and the notation x 
y denotes that the components of vector x are less than or
equal to the corresponding components of vector y. Taking the
maximum norm from both sides and using the left-stochastic
matrix property ‖GT ‖∞ = 1, we obtain:
max
1≤k≤N
E‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k , ‖EX i‖∞ < ρ2max‖EX i−1‖∞ + µ2κ
(99)
Let us consider the long-term scenario i  1. The far-field
regime (91) is more likely to occur when ck is small. Let us
now examine the situation in which the communication cost
is expensive (ck  0). In this case, the agents will operate in
a near-field regime, which we characterize by the condition:
Near-Field: Prob
{
‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k <
ckχk
ρ2max
}
> φ (100)
where ρmax is defined in (81). We note that
‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k <
ckχk
ρ2max
⇒ b¯k(i)θ`k(i) < ckχk
⇒ ak`(i) = 0 (101)
In this regime, it then holds with high likelihood that
Prob{ak`(i) = 0} ≈ 1 (102)
and the combination coefficients in (69)–(70) then become:
gkk(i) = 1, g`k(i) = 0 (103)
This means that agents will now be operating non-
cooperatively since the benefit of sharing estimates is small
relative to the expensive communication cost ck  0. Using
similar arguments to (97)–(99), we arrive at the same network
recursion (99) for this regime.
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However, there exists a third possibility that for moderate
values of ck, agents operate at a region that does not belong to
neither the far-field nor the near-field regimes. In this region,
agents will be choosing to cooperate or not depending on their
local conditions. To facilitate the presentation, let us introduce
the notation IE for an indicator function over event E where
IE = 1 if event E occurs and IE = 0 otherwise. Then, the
action policy (54) can be rewritten as:
ak`(i) = Ib¯k(i)θ`k(i)>ckχk (104)
From Lemma 2, we know that b¯k(i) is sandwiched within
an interval of width (ρ2max − ρ2min)‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k . As the error
‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k becomes smaller after sufficient iterations, the
feasible region of b¯k(i) shrinks. Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that b¯k(i) becomes concentrated around its mean
b¯k(i) , Eb¯k(i) for i 0. It follows that we can approximate
ak`(i) by replacing b¯k(i) by b¯k(i):
ak`(i) ≈ Ib¯k(i)θ`k(i)>ckχk , as i 1 (105)
To continue, we further assume that after long iterations, which
means that repeated interactions between agents have occurred
for many times, the reputation scores gradually become sta-
tionary, i.e., we can model {θ`k(i)} as
θ`k(i) = θ`k + n`k(i), as i 1 (106)
where θ`k , Eθ`k(i) and n`k(i) is a random disturbance
which is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over
time i and assumed to be independent of all other random
variables. Under this modeling, we can obtain the indepen-
dence between n`k(i) and w˜`,i−1 and write that for k 6= `
E
[
g`k(i)‖w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
]
= E
[
(1− αk)1`k(i)a`k(i)‖w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
]
≈ (1− αk)p`kE
[
Ib¯`(i)(θ`k+n`k(i))>ckχk · ‖w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,`
]
= g′`kE‖w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,` (107)
where
g′`k , (1− αk)p`kE
[
Ib¯k(i)(θ`k+n`k(i))>ckχk
] ≥ 0 (108)
For ` = k, we can use similar arguments to write
E
[
gkk(i)‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k
]
= E
[(
1−
∑
`∈Nk\{k}
(1− αk)1`k(i)a`k(i)
)
‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k
]
≈ g′`kE‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,` (109)
where
g′kk , 1−
∑
`∈Nk\{k}
g′`k ≥ 0 (110)
Therefore, expression (90) becomes
E‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k ≤ ρ2max
∑
`∈Nk
g′`kE‖w˜`,i−1‖2Ru,` + µ2κ (111)
Following similar arguments to (97)–(99), we again arrive at
the same network recursion (99).
We therefore conclude that after long iterations, the esti-
mation performance can be approximated by recursion (99)
for general values of ck. Consequently, sufficiently small
step-sizes that satisfy the following condition guarantees the
stability of the network error ‖EX i‖∞:
ρ2max < 1⇔ µ <
2
max
1≤k≤N
λmax(Ru,k)
(112)
which leads to
lim sup
i→∞
‖EX i‖∞ ≤ µ
2κ
1− ρ2max
(113)
Recalling that we are assuming sufficiently small µ, we have
ρ2max = max
1≤k≤N
max
1≤m≤M
(1− µλm(Ru,k))2
≈ max
1≤k≤N
max
1≤m≤M
1− 2µλm(Ru,k)
, 1− 2µβ (114)
where
β , min
1≤k≤N
λmin(Ru,k) (115)
It is straightforward to verify that the bound on the right-hand
side of (113) is upper-bounded by µκ/2β, which is O(µ).
Consequently, we conclude that
lim sup
i→∞
E‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k = O(µ) (116)
which establishes the mean-square stability of the network
under the assumed conditions and for small step-sizes.
B. Expected Individual and Public Cost
In this section we assess the probability that agents will
opt for cooperation after sufficient time has elapsed and the
network has become stable. From (116), we know that after
sufficient iterations, the MSE cost at each agent k is bounded,
say, as
E‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k ≤ ηµ, for i 1 (117)
for some constant η. Based on this result, we can upper bound
the cooperation rate of every agent k, defined as the probability
that agent k would select ak`(i) = 1 for every pairing agent
`.
Theorem 1: (Upper bound on cooperation rate) After suffi-
cient iterations, the cooperation rate for each agent k is upper
bounded by:
Prob{ak`(i) = 1} ≤ min
{
co
ck
, 1
}
, for any ck <∞
(118)
where co is independent of ck and defined as
co , ηµρ
2
max
χmin
, χmin , min
1≤k≤N
χk (119)
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Fig. 2. The feasible region of the probability of cooperation Prob{ak`(i) =
1} for agent k.
Proof: From (54), the cooperation rate of agent k is
bounded by:
Prob{ak`(i) = 1} = Prob
{
b¯k(i)θ`k(i) > ckχk
}
≤ Prob{b¯k(i) > ckχk}
≤ Prob
{
‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k >
ckχk
ρ2max
}
(120)
where we used the fact that θk`(i) ≤ 1 and the upper bound on
b¯k(i) from (80). Since ‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k is a nonnegative random
variable with E‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k ≤ ηµ, we can use Markov’s
inequality [56] to write
Prob
{
‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k >
ckχk
ρ2max
}
≤ ηµρ
2
max
ckχk
≤ c
o
ck
(121)
Combining (120) and (121), we obtain that the cooperation
rate for i 1 is upper bounded by co/ck. Using the fact that
Prob{ak`(i) = 1} ≤ 1, we get (118).
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the feasible region of Prob{ak`(i) =
1} is the intersection area of (118) and 0 ≤ Prob{ak`(i) =
1} ≤ 1. We note that co has an order of µ. It describes the fact
that when µ is small, the long term estimation errors reduce
and agents have less willingness to cooperate and thus the
cooperation rate Prob{ak`(i) = 1} becomes low. Now, the
expected communication cost for each agent k is
EJ comk =
∑
`∈Nk\{k}
E[1k`(i)ak`(i)]ck
=
∑
`∈Nk\{k}
pk` · Prob{ak`(i) = 1}ck (122)
where {k} is excluded from the summation since there is
no communication cost required for using own data. From
Theorem 1, we know that when ck is large, the expected
communication cost has an upper bound which is independent
of ck, i.e., for ck ≥ co,
EJ comk ≤
∑
`∈Nk\{k}
pk`
co
ck
ck = (1− pkk)co (123)
On the other hand, the expected estimation cost for each agent
k for i 0 is:
EJ estk = E|dk(i)− uk,iwk,i−1|2
= E‖w˜k,i−1‖2Ru,k + σ2v,k
≤ ηµ+ σ2v,k (124)
where we use (9) and the fact that w˜k,i−1 is independent of
{dk(i),uk,i}. It follows that for i 1 the expected extended
cost at each agent k is bounded by
E [Jk(wk,i−1,ak`(i))] = EJ estk + EJ comk
≤ ηµ+ σ2v,k + (1− pkk)co (125)
If we now define the public cost as the accumulated expected
extended cost over the network:
Jpub ,
N∑
k=1
E [Jk(wk,i−1,ak`(i))] (126)
then
Jpub ≤ Nηµ+
N∑
k=1
σ2v,k + c
o
N∑
k=1
(1− pkk) (127)
which shows that Jpub is uniformly bounded by a constant
value independent of ck.
For comparison purposes, let us consider a uniform trans-
mission cost ck = c and consider the case in (18) where the
agents are controlled so that they always share estimates with
their paired agents, i.e., ak`(i) = 1 for all k, `, and i whenever
1k`(i) = 1. Then, the random combination coefficients are the
same as (94)–(95) defined in the far-field since agents always
choose to cooperate. Let us denote the network mean-square-
deviation (MSD) of cooperative agents by
MSDcoop = lim
i→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
E‖w˜k,i‖2 (128)
which has a closed-form expression provided in [55]. There-
fore, we can characterize the performance of cooperative
agents by MSDcoop and note that for i 0, we have
N∑
k=1
E‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k ≥ Nβ ·MSDcoop (129)
where β is defined in (115). Consequently, after sufficient
iterations, the expected public cost for cooperative agents
becomes
Jpubcoop =
N∑
k=1
E‖w˜k,i‖2Ru,k + σ2v,k + c ∑
`∈Nk\{k}
E1k`(i)

≥Nβ ·MSDcoop+
N∑
k=1
σ2v,k+c
N∑
k=1
(1− pkk) (130)
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Comparing (127) with (130), we get Jpubcoop ≥ Jpub whenever
Nβ ·MSDcoop + c
N∑
k=1
(1− pkk) ≥ Nηµ+ co
N∑
k=1
(1− pkk)
⇔ c ≥ co + N [ηµ− β ·MSDcoop]
N∑
k=1
(1− pkk)
(131)
In other words, when the transmission cost c exceeds the above
threshold, self-interested agents using the reputation protocol
obtain a lower expected public cost than cooperative agents
running the cooperative ATC strategy.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider a network with N = 20 agents. The network
topology is shown in Fig. 3. The noise variance profile at the
agents is shown in Fig. 4. In the simulations, we consider
that the transmission cost ck = c is uniform and the matrix
Ru,k = Ru is uniform and diagonal. Figure 5 shows the entries
of the target vector wo of size M = 10 and the diagonal entries
of Ru. We set the step-size at µ = 0.01 and the combination
weight at αk = 0.5 for all k. The parameters used in the
reputation update rule are ε = 0.1 and the initial reputation
scores θk,`(0) = 1 for all agents k and `. The discount factor
δk and the smoothing factor rk for all k are set to 0.99 and
0.95, respectively, and the forgetting factor ν is set to 0.01.
In this simulation, we consider a distributed random-pairing
mechanism as follows. At each time instant, each agent inde-
pendently and uniformly generates a random continuous value
from [0, 1]. Then, the agent holding the smallest value in the
network, say agent k, is paired with the neighboring agent in
Nk who has not been paired and holds the smallest value in
Nk \ {k}. Then, similar steps are followed by the agent who
has not been paired and holds the second smallest value in
the network. The random-pairing procedure continues until all
agents complete these steps.
In Fig. 6, we simulate the learning curves of instantaneous
public costs for small and large communication costs. It is
seen that in both cases, using the proposed reputation protocol,
the network of self-interested agents reaches the lowest public
cost. Therefore, the network is efficient in terms of public cost.
Furthermore, we note that in these two cases, there is only
small difference between the performance of the reputation
protocol using Algorithm 1 and the real-time implementation.
To see the general effect of c, in Fig. 7 we simulate the
public cost in steady-state versus the communication cost c.
We observe that for large and small c, the reputation protocol
performs as well as the non-sharing and the cooperative
network, respectively. The only imperfection occurs around
the switching region. Without real-time implementations, the
reputation protocol has a small degradation in the range of
c ∈ [10−2, 10−1]. While using real-time implementations (61)–
(63), we can see that the degradation happens in a wider range
of c ∈ [10−4, 10−1]. In Fig. 8, we simulate the network benefit
defined as the largest achievable b¯k(i) averaged over all agents
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Fig. 3. A network topology with N = 20 agents.
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Fig. 4. The noise variance profile used in the simulations.
in steady state, i.e.,
bnet , lim
i→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
E[b¯k(i)] (132)
where b¯k(i) follows the real-time implementation in (61)–(63).
We note that the network benefits, bnet, for the non-sharing and
cooperative cases are invariant for different communication
costs since the behavior of agents is independent of c. More-
over, as expected in the form of (61), cooperative networks
generally give smaller steady-state estimation errors and thus
result in lower bnet. When the communication cost c increases,
self-interested agents following the proposed reputation pro-
tocol have less willingness to cooperate, and therefore have
larger estimation errors and predict higher values of the benefit
b¯k(i) in general.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the distributed information-sharing
network in the presence of self-interested agents. We showed
that without using any historical information to predict fu-
ture actions, self-interested agents with bounded rationality
become non-cooperative and refuse to share information. To
entice them to cooperate, we developed an adaptive reputation
protocol which turns the best response of self-interested agents
into an action-choosing rule.
16
2 4 6 8 10
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Index number m
(m
)
Entries of w
2 4 6 8 10
2
4
6
8
Index number m
(m
,m
)
Diagonal entries of Ro u
R
u
w
o
Fig. 5. Entries of wo and Ru used in the simulations.
0 50 100 150 200 250
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
Time
Pu
bl
ic
 c
os
t 
 (d
B)
c = 0.0001
Non−sharing
Cooperative (18)
Reputation (19), w/o real-time implement.
Reputation (19), w/ real−time implement.
pu
b
J
(a) Small communication cost c = 0.0001.
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Fig. 6. Learning curve of public cost Jpub for small and large communication
costs.
APPENDIX A
We can represent the best response rule (51) by some
mapping function, fk(·), that maps the available realizations
of θ`k(i) and wk,i−1 to ak`(i), i.e.,
ak`(i) = fk(θ`k(i), wk,i−1) (133)
We show the form of the resulting fk(·) later in (52). For now,
we note that construction (51) requires us to find the condition
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Fig. 7. Simulations of steady-state public costs Jpub.
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for
J∞
′
k,i [ak`(i) = 1|wk,i−1] < J∞
′
k,i [ak`(i) = 0|wk,i−1] (134)
Using (49), this condition translates into requiring
J∞
′
k,i [ak`(i) = 1|wk,i−1]− J∞
′
k,i [ak`(i) = 0|wk,i−1]
= ck +
∞∑
t=i+1
δt−ik 4J1k (t) +
∞∑
t=i+1
δt−ik 4J2k (t) < 0 (135)
where, for simplicity, we introduced
4J1k (t) , E
[
ak`(t)ck
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = 1,Ki]
− E
[
ak`(t)ck
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = 0,Ki] (136)
4J2k (t) , E
[
J actk (a`k(t))
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = 1,Ki]
− E
[
J actk (a`k(t))
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = 0,Ki] (137)
Following similar argument to (28), we combine Assumptions
1 and 2 to conclude that
ak`(t) = ak`(i), for t ≥ i (138)
so that
4J1k (t) = ck (139)
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Similarly, using the assumption wk,t−1 = wk,i−1 for t ≥ i
from (27), we have
E
[
J actk (a`k(t))
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = j,Ki]
= E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 1)
∣∣∣wk,t−1,ak`(i) = j,Ki]
×B(a`k(t) = 1)
+ E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 0)
∣∣∣wk,t−1,ak`(i) = j,Ki]
× (1−B(a`k(t) = 1)) (140)
for j = 0 or 1. From (37) and (38), we can write
E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 0)
∣∣∣wk,t−1,ak`(i) = j,Ki]
= E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 0)
∣∣∣wk,t−1]
E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 1)
∣∣∣wk,t−1,ak`(i) = j,Ki]
= E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 1)
∣∣∣wk,t−1]
since these two conditional expectations depend only on
wk,t−1. Therefore, expression (140) becomes:
E
[
J actk (a`k(t))
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = j,Ki]
= E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 0)
∣∣∣wk,t−1]
+B(a`k(t) = 1) ·
(
E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 1)
∣∣∣wk,t−1]
− E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 0)
∣∣∣wk,t−1] )
= E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 0)
∣∣∣wk,t−1]−B(a`k(t) = 1)bk(t)
where we used the definition for bk(t) from (35). We note
that using (39) we have bk(t) = bk(i) due to the assumption
wk,t−1 = wk,i−1. As a result, it follows that
E
[
J actk (a`k(t))
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = j,Ki]
= E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 0)
∣∣∣wk,t−1]−B(a`k(t) = 1)bk(i)
Let us denote by θjk`(t) the value of θk`(t) at time t if ak`(i) =
j is selected at time i. We utilize the assumption θ`k(t) =
θ`k(i) to rewrite B(a`k(t) = 1) as
B(a`k(t) = 1) = θ
j
k`(t)θ`k(i) (141)
It then follows that
E
[
J actk (a`k(t))
∣∣∣wk,i−1,ak`(i) = j,Ki]
= E
[
J actk (a`k(t) = 0)
∣∣∣wk,t−1]− θjk`(t)θ`k(i)bk(i)
Therefore, using (137) we get
4J2k (t) = [θ0k`(t)− θ1k`(t)]θ`k(i)bk(i) (142)
Now, we recall that following Assumption 1 and the considered
scenario 1k`(i) = 1, we have 1k`(t) = 1k`(i) = 1 for t ≥ i.
As a result, the reputation update in (45) can be approximated
by expression (43) for sufficiently small ε. Then, under (138),
the future reputation scores θ0k`(t) and θ
1
k`(t) are given by:
θ0k`(t) = θk`(i)r
t−i
k (143)
θ1k`(t) = θk`(i)r
t−i
k + (1− rk)
t−i−1∑
q=0
rqk
= θk`(i)r
t−i
k + (1− rt−ik ) (144)
Therefore, expression (142) becomes
4J2k (t) = −(1− rt−ik )θ`k(i)bk(i), for t > i (145)
Using (139) and (145), agent k then chooses ak`(i) = 1 if
ck +
∞∑
t=i+1
δt−ik ck −
∞∑
t=i+1
δt−ik (1− rt−ik )θ`k(i)bk(i) < 0
⇔
∞∑
t=i
δt−ik ck <
∞∑
t=i+1
δt−ik (1− rt−ik )θ`k(i)bk(i)
⇔ ck
1− δk < θ`k(i)bk(i)δk ·
(
1
1− δk −
rk
1− δkrk
)
⇔ γk(i) , bk(i)
ck
>
χk
θ`k(i)
(146)
where we introduced
χk ,
1− δkrk
δk(1− rk) (147)
The best response rule fk(·) therefore becomes
ak`(i) =
{
1, if γk(i) , bk(i)ck >
χk
θ`k(i)
0, otherwise
(148)
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